The political world lately seems to be filled with unexpected erosions of democracy. What is the most useful way to describe these phenomena? Do they all belong to a common syndrome?
I. Introduction
The political world lately seems to be filled with unexpected erosions of democracy. Some of these trends are associated with political figures who have risen to power -Trump, Putin, Chávez, Erdogan, Morales, Orbán, Correa, Kaczynski, Duterte -or were recently in powerThaksin, Berlusconi, Fujimori, the Kirchners -or are getting closer to power -Le Pen, Wilders, Haider, and others. Some of these instances include similar attacks on democratic institutions, especially the media, the courts, and legislatures. And in some cases erosion has gone so far as to constrain civil society organizations and political parties, to threaten the rule of law, to restrict effective suffrage, or to undermine the fairness of elections. Often these erosions, and possible erosions on the horizon, take place in the context of shifting mass attitudes such as extreme partisanship, ideological polarization, intense nationalism, hatred of ethnic minorities or immigrants, admiration of strong leaders, or declining support for democracy. Many of these erosions are unexpected, in the sense that they take place in countries that have been fairly democratic, or at least have held minimally acceptable elections, for a decade or more.
What is the most useful way to describe these phenomena? Do they all belong to a common syndrome? Certainly there are different degrees of erosion, but are there also different types? How common are such erosions in the world today? Is this a new phenomenon, or are there close parallels with events in the past? If we detect early warning signs of erosion, how concerned should we be that it will continue and culminate in the breakdown of democracy? I find that there are two distinct erosion paths. First, there is a classic path of growing repression of speech, media, assembly, and civil liberties, combined with deteriorating political discourse. There are differences of degree within this type. The most extreme cases preceded the (O'Donnell 1991) . However, I will show that other attributes of democracy also tend to erode as horizontal accountability deteriorates (albeit not as dramatically as on the classic path), which often makes it inaccurate to refer to these delegative cases as "democracies." Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro is by far the fullest realization of this tendency, with fainter echoes in Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. It also has partial parallels outside Latin America, as in the Thaksin government in Thailand, the Kuchma government in Ukraine, and the Gruevski government in Macedonia. Both paths -more the classic path than the delegative path -slightly increase the risk of a breakdown, defined here as the suspension of elections. But a more powerful and rigorous finding is that the erosion of horizontal accountability tends to increase corruption.
II. Data, Scope Conditions, and Disaggregation
Answering the questions of what is going on and which cases are good examples of it is an exercise in both conceptualization and measurement. In this exercise, I avoid the purely deductive extreme of defining a concept in the abstract (and then struggling to measure it) and the purely inductive extreme of finding patterns in data (and then struggling to make conceptual sense of them). Instead, my goal is to develop concepts and measures that are useful in the sense that they simultaneously resonate with the familiar constructs in our minds and are well aligned with the empirical relationships we can observe and measure. The hope is that such concepts and measures will prove to be useful for description and perhaps also for explaining the causes and consequences of different types of erosion of democracy. I therefore proceed by first defining the basic scope conditions implied by a rough version of the concept and choosing the existing index, a measure of liberal democracy, that best captures the property space of interest in a highly aggregated way. Second, I specify thresholds for declines in liberal democracy that do a good job of identifying the prototypical cases (and some others). Third, I disaggregate the index to learn whether the unexpected erosions of democracy tend to follow the same path or different paths. This is what reveals a distinction between diminished rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and diminished horizontal accountability, on the other. Finally, I disaggregate further to show that each path is internally diverse: no two cases of erosion register declines on exactly the same combinations of attributes. From this analysis, Chávez's Venezuela emerges as the most completely developed example of the erosion of horizontal accountability (although it also became much less democratic in other respects).
I offer answers to these questions with Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, which cover most countries from 1900 to the present. Because the V-Dem dataset contains indicators of hundreds of attributes of five conceptions of democracy, it is uniquely suited to the task of pinpointing which aspects of democracy have been eroding and evaluating whether it is more useful to treat them as a single coherent phenomenon, different independent trends, or something that is harder to classify. Most importantly, V-Dem data include some of the most valid and reliable indicators of institutions and practices in the realm of the media, courts, legislatures, elections, civil society, and political discourse.
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One limitation of V-Dem data is that they exclude public opinion data and therefore cannot address questions about changing mass attitudes. I consider mass attitudes unreliable indicators of how regimes actually perform: they probably track changes over time within countries fairly well (where long attitudinal time-series exist), but survey respondents lack comparative perspective and cannot be expected to give cross-nationally comparable answers. This is not to say that extremism, polarization, intolerance, and low institutional legitimacy are uninteresting. In fact, levels and shifts in such attitudes may serve as early warning signs of regime problems. However, I do not address them in this paper. The V-Dem dataset does include various indicators of deliberative democracy that pick up the quality of elite political discourse. However, while elite discourse may echo public opinion and even help shape it, it is best to treat elite behavior and mass opinion as distinct phenomena.
Defining and measuring the unexpected erosion of democracy depends crucially on scope conditions and the level of aggregation. Implicit in the idea of "unexpected erosions" of democracy is a focus on countries that, first, had already surpassed some minimum threshold of democracy and, second, remained there long enough for electoral politics to be considered normal. I operationalize this by including cases that attained a score on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index of at least 0.5 and remained at or above this level for at least eight years before any erosion started. A score of 0.5 is a reasonable threshold for a minimal version of democracy; one that was first met by the United Kingdom in 1911 , Spain in 1932 , Japan and India in 1952 , Chile in 1959 , Mexico in 1993 , and Tanzania in 2011 . Eight years is not a long enough period to ensure that democracy is the only game in town, but it is usually long enough to allow two elected governments to complete their terms. (It is also the longest possible period that allows me to include Russia in the analysis, as its score exceeded 0.5 only in 1992-1999. Given the salience of Vladimir Putin in discussions of the erosion of democracy, it seems important to use a low standard that includes his governments.)
A third scope condition is that the electoral regime continue. Once elections are suspended, we are talking about a breakdown of democracy, not erosion. Whether erosion, however it is defined, helps explain military coups and other events that truncate the electoral regime, is a separate question that I take up briefly below. Here I focus on the erosion of democracy while elections are still on course. I have also made an effort to exclude "erosion" (drops in democracy scores) that happens due to external events, such as occupation by another power.
2 My analysis therefore excludes occupations of Western European countries by Germany or the allies in the two world wars. 3 Other invasions such as those by Japan, the United States, or
Vietnam have rarely involved countries that met the other scope conditions.
Among countries that meet the scope conditions -countries that had been at least minimal electoral democracies for at least eight years immediately before, that continued to hold elections, and that were not invaded -what kinds of changes constitute "erosion"? My analysis proceeds from the general to the specific. If we define erosion as a drop in the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, which is the prefabricated index that is closest to the concept, then there are relatively few cases, it is not clear that they are comparable, and the trends reflect little of the potentially relevant variation. However, the more we disaggregate the concept, the more cases there are that experienced drops on some specific indicators but not others, the clearer it is which of these cases are similar in nature, and the more of the relevant variation they preserve. 
III. Drops in Liberal Democracy
Varieties of Democracy makes available five "high-level" indices to measure different conceptions of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian.
Empirically they are not very different because the electoral democracy index is an important component in the formula for calculating the other four (Coppedge et al. 2016 -IPSR) . Of the 20,274 country-year observations for 173 non-missing countries from 1900 to 2015 that make up version 6.2 of the V-Dem dataset, fifteen percent (3,089) meet the scope conditions. That is, they were minimal electoral democracies for at least eight years, with elections still on course by the end of that year, and without a foreign occupation. However, most of these cases are irrelevant for this analysis because we are interested in declines rather than advances; declines that were not short-term blips, quickly reversed; and declines that exceeded a certain magnitude. Given the overall global trend of increasing democracy, about 2,000 cases did not undergo a net decline in the subsequent five years; about 1,000 did decline. I use five years as the period long enough to exclude ephemeral changes, as it is long enough to encompass one term of most governments. The remaining question is how much of a drop is required to count a decline as a significant "drop" in liberal democracy. It would not be wise to include all drops because there is some measurement uncertainty in V-Dem data. There is measurement uncertainty in all social science data, but V-Dem data have the advantage of including estimates of how much uncertainty there is, in the form of lower and upper bounds for all variables generated by the measurement model or Bayesian factor analysis (Pemstein et al. 2016 Only 54 country-years in 23 countries experienced a decline in liberal democracy this large within five years of having sustained minimal electoral democracy for at least eight years. the press, politicized the courts, and worked relentlessly to marginalize the Kurdish PKK and an alleged "parallel state" conspiracy led by the cleric Fethullah Gülen.
All of these cases experienced erosions in liberal democracy, yet there are clear differences among them. Some ended in military coups, others in fascist dictatorships, and others led to subtler constraints on the courts, the media, civil society, or the party system and elections. Some were violent, others peaceful. This analysis using the liberal democracy index tells us only which cases declined, by how much, on this index; it does not tell us which aspects of liberal democracy declined. Did they all decline together? Did some aspects worsen while others did not? Did all these cases follow the same pattern of decline, perhaps to different degrees?
IV. Disaggregating the Two Components of Liberal Democracy
Fortunately, V-Dem data enable us to drill down, teasing apart which aspects declined and which did not. As a first cut, we can distinguish between the two indices used to construct the Liberal Democracy Index: the Electoral Democracy Index and the Liberal Component Index. Figure 2 overlays the relationship between these two measures for three different samples. The gray dots represent the entire sample: all 16,259 country-years that have scores on both indices. They are related: a high degree of electoral democracy is nearly sufficient for a high degree of liberalism, and a high degree of liberalism is practically necessary for a high degree of democracy. But at low levels of liberalism and electoral democracy, there is not much of a relationship. The black dots represent the cases meeting the scope conditions of having had electoral democracy for at least eight years, while keeping elections on course and not succumbing to foreign invasion. These cases conform to the same pattern as the full sample, which can be seen from their nearly indistinguishable lowess fit lines (in gray and black to match their respective samples).
The third sample, in red, follows a slightly different pattern, however. These are the cases that meet the scope conditions and also declined significantly in the subsequent five years. The lowess fit line is the same for the highest and lowest cases, but in the intermediate range,
approximately 0.5 < electoral democracy < 0.75, the red line dips below the other two. In this range, therefore, cases tend to decline more on the liberal component than they do on electoral democracy. They are erosions of horizontal accountability. The cases that most are most responsible for this dip are labeled, and it is rather startling to see that they are all Latin
American cases, and not just Latin American, but also governments that were allied with the Chávez government in Venezuela: Correa in Ecuador, Ortega in Nicaragua, and Morales in Bolivia, with Venezuela itself being the most influential case. This small cluster of cases clearly constitutes a distinct erosion path in which a government undermines horizontal accountability to a greater degree than it does electoral democracy. Why this pattern is found in these four countries, Figure 2 does not reveal; but it suggests that there is truth to anecdotes I have heard about the Chávez government sending teams of consultants out to other left-of-center governments in the region to spread the idea of consolidating political power before launching economic and social restructuring of the economy. 
V. Disaggregating to Eight Sub-Components of Liberal Democracy
We need not stop disaggregating at the two components: we can drill down further to the eight sub-components of liberal democracy, and also introduce the Deliberative Component Index into the analysis. The benefits of analyzing sub-components are that they preserve more of the variance measured by the most specific indicators, adding more distinct information to the analysis; it improves the qualitative clarity of the interpretations of the relationship, since we can distinguish a change in one subcomponent from a change in any other subcomponent; each subcomponent is less diluted with variance on irrelevant concepts; and disaggregating affords a better opportunity to analyze different dimensions in the data. In other words, disaggregating makes it more like that we will find distinct paths (if they exist) and that we will be able to interpret what those paths mean.
The eight sub-components that are conceptually relevant are Clean elections, Freedom of expression, Media pluralism, Civil liberties, Freedom of association, Judicial constraints on the executive, Legislative constraints on the executive, and deliberation. The structure and meaning of each of these components are fully described in the appendix. Using multiple components makes it possible to expand the sample to include cases that dropped on any of the eight, which is a lower threshold than dropping on enough of the eight to force a sufficiently large drop on a more aggregated index. There are 2,071 country-years that decline at all on any component and 214 cases that decline by at least 0.09.
The expanded sample gives us enough cases to analyze the dimensionality of declines in components for cases that meet the scope conditions. Table 1 reports an exploratory factor analysis of the 201 cases with complete data on all eight components, which finds that there are two significant factors.
6 Each factor represents a distinct dimension in the data, suggesting two different paths of erosion in democracy. The first dimension is most closely aligned with freedom of expression and the existence of alternative sources of information, but it is also strongly correlated with the deliberative component, freedom of association, and civil liberties (the "Equality before the law and individual liberty index"). We can call this a "rights and freedoms" dimension: countries that decline on this dimension primarily lose rights and freedoms. Two of the three components loading on the second dimension are the familiar judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, which constitute horizontal accountability.
But the Clean elections component also loads on this factor, which suggests that some vertical accountability is included as well, although the two horizontal components contribute more than twice as much to this dimension as vertical accountability does. We can therefore call this an "accountability" dimension: countries that decline on this dimension primarily suffer losses of accountability, especially horizontal accountability. Figure 3 plots the factor scores for these two dimensions. All 201 cases are plotted, but only those with the largest drops in any component are labeled so that most of the labels are legible. There is clearly more than one dimension, and in fact, the cases appear to be clustered along two lines: one line tracing a path on which rights and freedoms erode more than accountability does, and another path on which accountability declines more than rights and freedoms do. I have colored the cases along the first path blue and those along the second path red, and overlaid linear fit lines for each group to accentuate these clusters, but they would be evident without the visual assist. 7 For example, the region between the two fit lines is more sparsely populated.
Many of the same cases that eroded on liberal democracy also appear in this disaggregated analysis, only now we can classify them into two different types of erosion. Among the most eroded cases on the rights and freedoms dimension are the previously listed cases of 7 Cases are colored red if their scores on the second factor are less than 65 percent of their scores on the first factor. This rubric efficiently separates the two clusters. The fit lines are estimated separately for these two clusters. 
VI. Further Disaggregation, to Indicators
It is possible to disaggregate further and analyze the relationships among the 29 most specific indicators that constitute the eight components above. Some additional potentially useful information could be uncovered this way, as the components do not explain a quarter of the variance measured by the specific indicators. However, an exploratory factor analysis of all of the specific indicators together is not revealing. Most of the variables load on a first factor that accounts for only about 60 percent of the variance, and the rest load on two or three factors that are not robust. The nature of the additional factors depends on the threshold of change one uses: sometimes they measure freedom of discussion, sometimes judicial independence, and sometimes both. Analyzing the dimensions of the components, as in the previous section, yields a clearer, more interpretable picture of the relationships in the data.
A better way to make use of the specific indicators is to examine changes in each variable within countries, and then group together countries that experienced drops in the same variables.
This kind of analysis can reveal the extent to which different countries have eroded in the same specific ways. It is hard not to miss the forest for the trees in such an analysis, as Figure 4 demonstrates. This figure is a network graph that maps Second, Venezuela stands out as the country where democracy, especially on the accountability dimension, has eroded the most, in the largest number of ways, and over the longest span of time. It is hard to have a discussion of unexpected erosion or backsliding of democracy without mentioning Venezuela: it is the ideal-type. For the same reason, it is far from the most typical case. As Figure 4 shows, there were declines on 13 specific indicators in Venezuela. The next-closest case is Fiji, which declined on nine, followed by Argentina, Thailand, and Ecuador, which declined on five. Varying the threshold for a "decline" would alter these counts but not the exceptional nature of the erosion of democracy in Venezuela. The depth of Venezuela's decline is also plain to see in figures 1-3. Other cases share some family resemblances to the Venezuelan ideal-type, especially Ecuador, Argentina, Thailand (and maybe Bolivia also qualifies for respecting counterarguments, range of consultation, election intimidation, executive oversight, and EMB autonomy. Turkey would qualify as having eroded on the rights and freedoms dimension. Nicaragua is mostly invariant, but it would qualify on the multiparty elections indicator. Surprisingly, Hungary and Macedonia do not qualify on either dimension even with a -1 threshold. This may be an artifact of version 6.2 of the data; I expect they will be included when using version 7.
VII. Consequences
Do these erosion paths matter? A simple preliminary analysis suggests that there is a significantly increased risk that the electoral regime in a year following erosion, but this relationship seems to be driven almost entirely by Venezuela. However, as Table 2 shows, there is much stronger relationship between the accountability dimension and corruption, even in very rigorous estimates (lagged DV, lagged accountability, controlling for the first dimension and logged per capita GDP, clustered by country, with fixed effects). Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between the rights and freedoms dimension and corruption. The regimes with eroded accountability are among the most corrupt countries in the world: Russia, Venezuela, El Salvador, Bangladesh, Thailand, Dominican Republic, and Guyana, for example. One wonders whether corruption is the motivation for limiting accountability in the first place; or whether the lack of horizontal accountability just permits the growth of corruption, which then makes it harder to restore accountability. It appears to be more the latter, as in a similarly specified model, lagged corruption does not explain accountability. 
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To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved? Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisionsas contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels from preference formation to final decision among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels. Omitted from this analysis: Common good
